If you recently used Cargo, make sure your system didn’t get infected. Here is another article with a little more info: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/arrayref-rust-crate-supply-chain-attack
If you recently used Cargo, make sure your system didn’t get infected. Here is another article with a little more info: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/arrayref-rust-crate-supply-chain-attack
These build scripts should really be restricted. For any language, not just Rust.
There have been discussions in the past around sandboxing build scripts, but until that day comes (if it does), I think there could at least be a prompt to approve build scripts for individual package versions. Several JS package managers do this now, and it helps.
Ya, this type of design (npm, Rust, Go?) seems crazy to me. I’m glad I use Java in my day job, haven’t run into any build script attacks yet.
I guess Rust probably chose it so you can build easily on any system? But why can build scripts download stuff an me inject it?
Almost all non-trivial projects in any language have external dependencies. And those dependencies have to come from somewhere.
I also wonder what you think Maven/Gradle/…etc job is.
Gradle and Maven create static build artifacts, they do not dynamically run 3rd party build scripts. And it is uncommon (though not impossible) to use dynamic version targets.
I’m it saying it’s an impossible attack vector Java, but I haven’t seen it yet and I’ve seen it a couple times with Rust and countless times with Javascript. The Javascript ones now use your credentials to publish even more malicious build scripts, so it spreads like a virus.